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■ The Accounting Debate
The popular case for expensing stock
options is largely a reaction to revela-
tions of corporate fraud and wrongdoing
over the past several years. It seemed
that executives could grant themselves
huge options in lieu of other compensa-
tion, which, because they were not
reported as an expense, made the firm’s
earnings look good. Good earnings
increased the stock price, after which the
executives could exercise the option at
great profit—in the vernacular, “pump
and dump.”
The accounting case is perhaps more
staid. Net income should measure firm
compensation costs, and options are a
cost. As a recent article by Robert
Kaplan (developer of the balanced score-
card), Robert Merton (Nobel Prize,
1997), and Zvi Bodie put it, “It is a basic
principle of accounting that financial
statements should record economically
significant transactions.” Options clearly
have value—that is why employees take
them as compensation—and thus should
be treated as an expense, just as stock
grants and deferred compensation are
treated as an expense. Furthermore, they
represent an expense to the firm—which
might have sold the options to outside
investors instead of giving them to the
employee. The ultimate goal of an
accounting standard is to make the 
earnings of different firms comparable:
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Many market commentators argue 
that companies should expense the
stock options they give their employees. 
Will expensing give investors better
information about what companies
earn and spend?
Many companies give stock options
to their employees as a form of compen-
sation. This gives the employees the
right to buy company stock at a given
price (the “strike price”), though often
employees cannot exercise the option
until a year or more has passed. If the
firm’s stock goes up, the employee can
get the stock and make a tidy profit.
Firms often find options a good way to
compensate employees: Along with
restricted stock grants, options can give
the employee a stake in the firm’s suc-
cess and serve both as motivation and
reward. Furthermore, they are a way to
pay employees without handing over
cash, which many start-up firms need to
pay outside suppliers.
The popularity of options has engendered
a surprisingly intense controversy about
how these options should be accounted
for, and what effect they should have on
the firm’s reported earnings. Some people
argue that the option should count as a
compensation expense to the firm (which
in turn reduces the firm’s reported earn-
ings), others that it shouldn’t. Each side
has its share of prominent politicians,
business leaders, and Harvard professors
(Alan Greenspan, Warren Buffet, and
Robert Merton for expensing, George W.
Bush, Andrew Grove, and William
Sahlman, against). The numbers involved
are large enough to be striking: In 2001,
AOL Time Warner (now known as Time
Warner) reported an operating income 
of $700 million, but expensing stock
options would have resulted in a loss of
$1.7 billion. The difference is most
notable in so-called new economy firms;
expensing stock options would double
the number of firms in the computer, 
software, Internet, telecommunications,
and networking industries with negative
pretax earnings in 1999 (from 23 percent
to 45 percent). 
This debate does not reflect a sudden
taste for arcane accounting among
America’s leaders. Rather, it reflects dis-
agreement over whether the proposed
changes will make reported earnings
more or less informative to investors. So
while understanding the issues requires
some accounting, the real questions 
concern economics.
■ The Current Situation
In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board
(the organization authorized to establish
accounting standards) issued APB 25, a
standard that required companies to treat
options as an expense measured by the
“intrinsic value” of the options, that is, the
difference between the current price of
the stock and the strike price. Thus, if a
company with stock price of $10 issued
options with a strike price of $10 or
higher, there would be no expense. This
was, in fact, the practice followed by most
firms, so the options had no impact on
earnings whatsoever.
In 1995, the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (the successor to the
Accounting Principles Board) issued
SFAS 123. This standard recommended
that firms expense options using a “fair
value” calculated using an option-pric-
ing model, although it allowed firms to
continue to use APB 25 if they wished.
(Option-pricing models did not exist in
1972.) If a firm uses the “intrinsic value”
approach, however, it must calculate a
“pro forma net income,” that is, net
income using the fair value approach,
and report this in the footnotes. Most
firms continued using APB 25.
The current controversy revolves around
whether or not firms should be required
to use the fair value method, which
effectively would force them to count
employee stock options as an expense,
reducing net income.A firm’s earnings shouldn’t look higher
than another’s just because it paid 
workers with options rather than cash.
Some people, though, argue that the
options are already accounted for. If
employees exercise their options, they
will get shares of stock, and this will
increase the total number of shares out-
standing of the company’s stock. Thus,
when the firm reports its earnings-per-
share ratio, or EPS, it is lower because
there are more shares. Furthermore,
even before the options are exercised,
the company must report EPS on a
“fully diluted basis,” counting the shares
from the options even if they haven’t
been exercised. Fully diluted EPS
counts all the shares the firm has an
obligation to issue, even if the firm 
hasn’t, or won’t, issue them. 
Is this adjustment enough to solve the
problem? No. First, the fully diluted
EPS doesn’t actually count all the
shares a firm has an obligation to issue;
EPS needs to be adjusted for options
only when the current stock price is
higher than the option’s exercise price,
so not all options are reflected in the
diluted EPS. That is, the dilution is
incomplete. Second, this adjustment
makes an adjustment to the number of
shares but not to the earnings of the
firm. An option should affect the earn-
ings part of EPS as well as the per share
part. Finally, earnings are used in other
measures of company performance
beyond EPS, such as return on invest-
ment and economic value added, and
these are not affected by dilution.  
■ The Economic Debate
Opponents of expensing are less likely to
argue the fine points of accounting and
more likely to stress the negative eco-
nomic consequences. They have three
main arguments: Current reporting in
footnotes is enough disclosure; expensing
employee stock options would add noise
to earnings reports because these options
are hard to value; and expensing would
particularly hurt small, growing firms. 
The economics behind these arguments
bears a closer look, however. Often the
arguments made in discussing stock
options (on both sides!) are inconsistent.
You can’t really argue both that investors
already know the true value of the
options and that options are too hard for
firms to value. Likewise, if you think that
investors already deduct options from
earnings, don’t say that expensing will
make it easier to compare earnings
across firms. Either people have the
information or they don’t. 
Enough Already 
If people have the information, then the
accounting question does not matter.
After all, changing how the expense is
reported won’t sell more cars or reduce
worker turnover. SFAS 123 already man-
dates that firms report the options in their
financial statements. Why should it matter
if this information is reported on one line
rather than another? Put differently, if the
market already values these options, there
would be little benefit to counting them as
an expense. 
There is good evidence that investors can
see through accounting conventions and
that changes to standards that alter the
form or placement rather than the
amount or type of information have little
effect on the value of the firm. For exam-
ple, firms may value their inventory
using either a last-in-first-out (LIFO) or
a first-in-first-out (FIFO) method. Using
LIFO decreases reported earnings but
can result in lower taxes. When firms
switch from FIFO to LIFO, their stock
price increases, even though earnings
decline; the market understands that the
firm has gained value by reducing taxes,
even if earnings don’t show the gain.
Similarly, stock prices react to pro forma
earnings, which have been adjusted for
option expenses, so the market does find
information on employee stock options,
even when it’s reported in the footnotes.
Investors and analysts pour over these
financial statements, filling up nearly
endless newsletter columns and chat-
room bandwidth with their analyses and
interpretations.
Even so, expensing may still increase
information. Firms report earnings quar-
terly, but the footnotes about options
appear only annually. Earnings figures
get greater scrutiny from executives and
auditors than do footnotes, and so may
be more accurate. Of course, opponents
will hardly think the extra information
worth the added administrative cost. 
In the end, all the fuss really makes
sense only if investors do not have full
information about firms and take some
sort of cue from earnings reports. Unfor-
tunately, we do not know the answer to
this question yet, but if the footnotes
don’t provide sufficient information, the
implications are worth getting excited
about. Chairman Greenspan perhaps said
it best: 
“There is a legitimate question as to
whether markets see through the
current nonexpensing of options. If
they do, moving to an explicit recog-
nition of option expense in reported
earnings will be a nonevent. If, how-
ever, markets do not fully see
through the failure to expense real
factor inputs, market values are dis-
torted and real capital resources are
being diverted from their most effi-
cient employment. This would be an
issue of national concern.”
Earnings Distortion
Opponents of expensing warn that not
only does expensing options have few
potential benefits (because they contend
current disclosure is enough), but that it
may seriously distort the earnings sig-
nal. It is here that they bring up argu-
ments about employee stock options
being hard to value, so that expensing
them would add noise to earnings. 
While it might seem unclear that
employee stock options are harder to
value than other common expenses,
such as stock grants, future product lia-
bility settlements, or medical retirement
benefits, the adjustments needed may
make valuation nontrivial. One econo-
mist, Mark Rubinstein, provides a com-
pelling illustration of the difficulties
involved. Using an option-pricing model
and varying a few assumptions about
choices that firms can make at their 
discretion, he was able to get a range of
option prices from $19 to $36 for an
option really worth $29. Now, any num-
ber in that range is closer to the mark
than the $0 currently being used, but add
in the uncertainty of how the standard
will be written and the ability of firms to
“game the system,” and expensing
options might very well make earnings
reports noisier.
Small Firms Harder Hit
Noisy earnings reports would hurt
small, growing firms more than others,
say expensing opponents. Opponents
further argue that if young firms were
forced to expense their options, net
income would be much smaller, making
those firms unable to find financing.
Firms might then forgo options, but then
they could not hire the quality people
they need. 
This argument rests on a very delicate
view of what the market does and 
doesn’t know and, on the face of it, does
not make economic sense. If the marketcorrectly values options—the full infor-
mation case—then reporting them on a
different line won’t matter. If the market
has trouble valuing options, then report-
ing them as an expense gets the needed
information out there. Using accounting
tricks to make earnings look better
smacks of getting funding under false
pretenses. In fact, this is just what pro-
ponents of expensing argue—that given
a clearer picture of earnings, people
wouldn’t have invested in Worldcom
and Enron. Only if, for some reason, the
government both wants to subsidize
small firms and finds that the cheapest
way to do so is to ignore the option
expense, does this story make sense. 
Reconsidering the question of whether
earnings reports currently provide suffi-
cient information to investors may pro-
vide a more sensible way to evaluate the
claim, however. Although stock prices
reflect costs reported in the footnotes,
they may not fully reflect the costs.
Moving the costs to earnings may have
an effect, particularly if it makes the
costs easier to compare across firms.
This may have a downside, though,
because lack of information may very
well make the uncertainties Rubinstein
identifies in calculating option value
larger for small firms. To the extent that
noise in earnings reports is also larger,
this increased uncertainty can make
investors less willing to fund small firms.
■ Beyond the Investor
The stock market is not the only place
where questions about the information in
reported earnings matter. Expensing
stock options can make compensation
more transparent—not just to the stock
market, where a few smart investors can
move prices to where they should be—
but to rank-and-file investors, who are
more important for corporate gover-
nance. After all, it’s pretty obvious that
stockholders don’t know everything
going on at the firm, and increased infor-
mation about the pay and incentives of
managers is useful. Clarifying compen-
sation contracts can make it harder for
executives to use options to expropriate
wealth from the shareholders. 
It turns out that a good predictor of
whether a firm has lobbied against
expensing stock options is the amount
of options granted to senior executives.
It’s not just that these firms gave out a
lot of options and therefore would face
a big decline in earnings—because
what matters is not total options given
to all employees, but just those given to
the senior executives. It seems possible
that options were one way of hiding
high executive compensation from
shareholders, and expensing would
make it harder to hide. 
■ Manage What You Measure
One argument in favor of expensing
stock options asserts not that companies
are hiding costs from their investors, but
from themselves. Some evidence shows
that employees only value options at 
25 percent to 50 percent of their cost to
the firm. After all, the employee is 
taking on more risk—so if the firm does
poorly, not only is he laid off, but his
portfolio suffers as well. An outside
investor with the option in her portfolio
is unlikely to face such a double
whammy. Giving options thus looks like
an expensive way to compensate people.
Why would firms do it? 
An economist’s view is that options are a
particularly good form of compensa-
tion—helping with motivation, reten-
tion, and cash flow problems—and thus
well worth their cost. Some people,
however, argue that firms are making a
mistake. Because the firms don’t have to
put out any cash or reduce accounting
profits, they think the options are
cheaper, and thus overuse them. Expens-
ing stock options, then, would make the
firms realize the cost of what they are
doing. Expensing options does not
change the benefits of using options to
motivate and retain people, but if firms
realize the costs involved, then alterna-
tives, such as restricted stock grants,
might look better. If it is true that people
will manage what they measure, then
forcing firms to measure the stock-
option expense will make them realize
the costs involved and reduce their use. 
Although it may seem strange (to some)
that firms are making such an obvious
mistake, their doing so may make sense
on some level. One reason is that if
management’s compensation depends
on earnings or the current stock price,
managers have an incentive to hit earn-
ings targets and keep the stock price up.
If they can do that by using stock options
instead of compensation that must be
expensed, they will. Mandating that
options be expensed removes the tempta-
tion. Another reason is that the mistake is
perhaps not so obvious. Acquiring—and
using—information is costly, even for the
firm itself. The attempts by companies to
accurately measure their true costs and
benefits have led to a long list of manage-
ment systems, including the balanced
scorecard, six-sigma quality programs,
and reengineering, not to mention sup-
porting a virtual army of consultants,
change gurus, and caterers at corporate
retreats.
A very similar change has already been
observed. Firms used to reprice their
stock options quite often. If the stock
price declined, a firm would lower the
exercise price of its options so that
employees had a better chance of cash-
ing in. In 1998, however, the FASB
changed the rules and counted repriced
options in a way that reduced earnings.
Firms then dramatically reduced their
repricing of options—even though the
accounting change had no impact on
the cash flow of firms, only on how
things were reported.
■ Beneficial Controversy 
The accounting case for expensing
employee stock options looks quite
strong. The economic case is consider-
ably weaker, and indeed raises a puzzle.
If the economic effects are so small, why
all the fuss? Business school professors
we can perhaps understand, but what
gets the president of the United States
and the chairman of the Federal Reserve 
into the middle of an arcane accounting 
dispute? 
Evidence from the stock market indicates
that the current method of reporting
option expenses is providing information
to investors. Whether it is the right
amount or not is still open to dispute.
Possibly reporting earnings net of
option expenses will make it easier to
compare firms and benefit investors,
though it is also just as possible that the
resulting accounting rule will obscure
comparisons. 
Perhaps, though, too exclusive a focus
on investors misses the central issues.
To the extent that expensing stock
options will bring executive pay under
greater scrutiny, some executives may
have reason to dislike it. Whether they
fear greater transparency will hurt their
bargaining position vis a vis the firm or
worry about added regulatory oversight
is matter of opinion. Likewise, this con-
troversy may present an opportunity for
firms to reexamine their compensation
plans and rethink the true costs—and
benefits—of employee stock options,
whatever the ultimate accounting 
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